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ABSTRACT
Trans-Atlantic elements in the Domestic policy attitudes of the British
and American Conservative Movements,1980-1990.
This paper explores the relationship between British and American Conservative
activists during the 1980s when Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan
dominated the politics of their respective countries. It does so mainly via looking
at the most popular right-wing magazines in either country at the time; The
Spectator and National Review.

Liberal International? The American takeover of London’s Spectator
newspaper, 1859-1861.
This paper casts a critical eye on the few previous histories of this period in the
history of London’s The Spectator newspaper; a brief two years when it was
owned edited by Americans working for the Buchanan administration in London.
It goes on to attempt to analyse what the paper in the period reveals about
similarities in British and American politics and about relations between the
British Liberal and American Democratic parties.
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Intellectual Biography
For my first research paper on The Atlantic World I struggled to pick a topic at
first. The focus of Atlantic history seemed to be on cultural practices and relations
rather than the directly political history which I am most interested in.
Furthermore, the nature of Atlantic History seems to lead historians of the field to
analyse the period of colonisation and the early stages of independent nations in
the New world. This did not fit well with my passion for twentieth century politics.
However, after discussion with Dr Aubert it became apparent that a paper which
focused on modern Anglo-American politics was within the scope of the research
paper.
Early on I realised that I wanted the focus of my paper to be conservatism.
Political ideology fascinates me. For my undergraduate research I attempted to
analyse the ideology of Senator Richard Russell of Georgia during the 1950s and
60s. A major aspect of this was attempting to establish what being a
“conservative” meant in the period, and whether Russell fit into such a definition.
It was when studying Russell that I first used National Review as a historical
source. Having spent this time focusing on a conservative figure, as well as much
more time on both Reagan and Thatcher’s governments than others, I was far
more aware of the history of conservative rather than socialist or liberal ideology.
My experience was not the sole reason for my decision. Much of contemporary
political science and political history focuses on Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher. Historians of both America and Britain identify them as having caused
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great change in their respective countries and around the world. In addition, the
idea of the “special relationship” was reinforced by the closeness of the two
leaders and their similar ideological vision. Indeed, the 1980s were unique in how
similarly the British and American heads of government saw the world. The
emergence of the conservative “New Right” as the dominant political force
happened at the same time in both nations, and there is significant if not
substantial historical literature on this development. Given that I had decided I
wanted to compare British and American political ideology, conservatism in the
1980s emerged as a topic of interest.
It was apparent to me that it would be almost impossible to offer any fresh
research on Thatcher and Reagan based on the amount of investigation there
has already been, as well as time and source constraints. What has been less
closely examined is the movement (the “Conservative Movement”) which
Thatcher and Reagan were figureheads of. At first I had the idea of exploring the
origins of the movement in the late 60s and early 70s, perhaps drawing on some
my past investigation into Richard Russell, before an analysis of how the
movement developed once it gained power through the 1980s. I considered
drawing upon an array of private think-tanks, academics, as well as political
journals and magazines. It became apparent however, that this was far too broad
for the research paper. Thus it had to be narrowed down to the 1980s. This was
the period when there was most clearly a New Right in both nations that could be
compared and contrasted.
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The mass of sources meant the project remained unfeasible. Comparing the New
Right as a whole in Britain and the United States would be worthy of a
monograph at least. The history that has been written of the non-politicians of the
New Right has often focused on think-tanks. That fact, combined with ease of
access to sources, meant that I decided popular right-wing publications were the
best thing for me to research. By comparing similar newspapers in either country
I could get a sense of what typical “New Right” attitudes were. The Spectator and
National Review were by far the most popular right-wing weekly political
publications in Britain and America respectively. They could thus serve as useful
gauges of popular opinion amongst the New Right.
My paper focused primarily on comparing the ideology evident in these two
newspapers. What it found was a large degree of overlap on both economic (free
market, competition and fiscal policy) and social issues. The papers were broadly
shared an ideological outlook which combined historically liberal economics
focusing on freedom with a traditional outlook on social issues. Crucially, the
economic arguments centred around the justness of competition and the freedom
to act in the market. In addition, the justification for socially conservative policies
was rarely seen by the authors of the magazines as anti-freedom. Rather,
arguments were constructed in a way which suggested that the constraints they
wanted on certain practices was not about governmental regulation, but
supposedly the avoidance of privileging certain people and practices. As such
there was a clear ideological thread used to justify economic and social policy in
both countries.
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Probably what was most striking was just how similar the ideological case made
in both newspapers was. The “Special Relationship” was reflected at the
grassroots level as well as the governmental. In addition, it was interesting to
discover evidence of common influences on the New Right on either side of the
Atlantic from Neoliberal academics and economists.
My paper gives a snapshot rather than a clear picture of the New Right due its
relatively narrow focus. If I were to expand on it, I would try and consider thinktanks and policy advisors as well as more newspapers. In order to improve the
paper as it is I would expand the newspapers used as sources. I had planned to
use Britain’s Salisbury Review and The Wall Street Journal as well. However,
once I did so it became apparent that The Wall Street Journal was far more
consistently liberal in its outlook than the other papers. It shared a passion for the
free market, but this was largely unmitigated by conservative attitudes. I felt
therefore that it would not make for a fair trans-Atlantic comparison so dropped it.
To improve my paper, I would like to consider The Wall Street Journal, the
Salisbury Review and other papers. I would attempt to draw out the differences
evident in the magazines and attempt to explore what these differences might
mean, and whether they are different in either country.
I was far less clear on a topic for my second research paper on the Early
American Republic. Beyond one class in my freshman year of undergraduate
studies on American expansion, it was a period I had not studied at either school
or university. It also lay outside of my favoured twentieth century period.
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I decided that I wished to continue to analyse political ideology. Having used the
press as evidence in my first paper, it also seemed sensible to continue down
that path. After my first paper it felt to me that a newspaper was an excellent and
efficient way to study a large number of policy opinions and an overall ideology. If
one can locate copies of the paper easily it also reduces the need to go to an
archive or research primary sources so extensively. In addition, having focused
so much on conservative politics I decided I should do if not the opposite, then
different politics. As such liberalism emerged as the ideology to study and in the
American context the Democrats as the party to look at.
At first I wished to do a similar analysis to my first paper, but focusing only on
one country rather than a trans-Atlantic approach. I had the idea of seeking out a
strongly pro-Democratic newspaper from the 1850s and using it as a lens to
judge the political ideology of the Democrats in the era. However, speaking to Dr
Grasso he suggested that such history had been well covered.
Lacking a clear topic, my attention turned to The Spectator. Having used it as a
major source in my first paper I knew it had once been a very liberal newspaper. I
was also aware that the London paper had for a period been taken over by
Buchananite Democrats. Having been so little covered by historians, this seemed
like a viable source to focus on for the research paper. I was hopeful that I would
find clear evidence both of Democratic and (British) Liberal Party ideology in the
paper, and evidence for how similar their respective ideologies were. In addition,
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I hoped that there might be some historical significance to be drawn upon
regarding the effort by Americans to control a British newspaper.
As it turned out, my research topic was not greatly illuminating. My hope for
evidence of ideological overlap was met, but little of the paper presented
anything new on the topic. It seemed to confirm ideas which have been
expressed previously, especially by R. Kelley. The analysis of the newspaper
itself was interesting both to write and to do the research for. However, my
conclusion was that the paper was relatively insignificant. It was a remarkable
and unique incidence but there is little evidence either of any input from senior
statesman or that the paper had much influence on British attitudes to America.
Thus interesting as the paper was to research, it was somewhat lacking in
research which offered historically significant new opinions.
If I were to expand the paper, I would borrow an idea from my first paper and
compare it directly to an American newspaper of the same era. This would create
a broader scope with which to analyse the nature of American and Democratic
party ideology. I would also consider comparing it in depth to other British Liberal
papers of the time rather than merely in passing. Researching another paper in
depth may reveal differences in The Spectator’s coverage which were not
apparent by focusing so squarely on it alone. I would also in the future consider
certain questions which my research brought up. Why did laissez-faire attitudes
take over these two political parties and not other ones? Why was the American
Republican Party so much more evangelical than the British Conservative Party?

6

Was the American Whig Party like the British Tory Party, or did Whigs merely
admire Britain’s apparently more aristocratic society?

7

Trans-Atlantic elements in the Domestic policy attitudes of the British and
American Conservative Movements, 1980-1990.

The rise of the Conservative Movement was the defining feature of both
American and British politics in the final quarter of the twentieth century. The rise
of the so-called “New Right” was so critical because it marked such a seachange from the prevailing generally moderate trend of conservative politics in
these 2 nations. Both the Republican Party in the United States and the
Conservative Party in the United Kingdom had shifted towards a more moderate
platform in the decades following World War Two. Most significantly, Social
Democratic economic policies which used the power of government in a bid both
to boost the economy, and to make society more equal, had been tacitly
accepted in both countries.
Therefore, the subsequent rise of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher to the
leadership of these two parties was indicative of radical transformation in rightwing politics in both countries. This paper will attempt to analyse more broadly
the “Movements” of which Thatcher and Reagan were the figureheads, and how
these movements related to one another rather than focusing on Reagan and
Thatcher themselves. It will also seek to gauge how connected the ideas of the
New Right in Britain and America were.
It would be wrong to suggest that attention has not been paid by historians to
either the Conservative Movement or to the Thatcher-Reagan relationship. Most
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notably, a seminal work was published in 2012 by James Cooper in which he
argues that bonds of personality and similarities in rhetoric were more in
evidence than actual policy similarities.1 Yet for the most part historians have yet
to analyse the Conservative Movement in a trans-Atlantic context. Cooper’s work
touches on the “New Right” but is above all a focus on the two leaders. Similar
analysis by political historians of political figures, parties and institutions in the
late 1970s and ‘80s has tended to focus on either the United Kingdom or United
States. The best example of a comprehensive study of the Conservative
Movement is George Nash’s The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America
since 1945.2 When a more international approach has been taken, such as that
of Mirowski and Plehwe,3 it has mostly focused specifically on neoliberal
economics than on Conservatism as a whole. Their work is also more about the
early growth of neoliberal ideas in the mid twentieth century than its application in
the latter part.
Atlantic history has generally speaking avoided history this recent. Indeed, whilst
Atlantic historians aim to take an approach which allows them to examine events,
interactions and perspectives beyond current or past national frameworks,4 the
chronological shifts in the New World seem to have had a great influence on

1

James Cooper, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan: A Very Political Special Relationship
(2012).

2

George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (2006).
P. Mirowski and D. Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of Neoliberal
Thought Collective (Cambridge, MA, 2009).
4
David Armitage, “Three Concepts of Atlantic History” in David Armitage and Michael J.Braddick,
eds., The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (2002), 13-14.
3
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them. Relatively little attention is granted beyond the early nineteenth century
and the emergence of independent states across the Americas.5 However, in
some ways this limited focus of Atlantic history plays to the advantage of this
paper. It allows for some of the historiographical concepts beloved by Atlanticists
to be deployed within a new framework.
The consistency of Anglo-American political interaction during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries is significant, because it ensured that there was a consistent
closeness between the United Kingdom and United States. This closeness was
reflected in the political developments of the eighties; the USA and UK were the
world’s only major powers where spending did not rise as proportion of GDP.
Thus, whilst it is common to suggest that neoliberalism has been adopted in part
by all countries in the entire West in the past thirty years, the UK and US were
the starting places for that development. This, combined with the cultural
similarities of the two nations, makes investigating connections in political
ideology worthwhile.
The term conservative is one which can be hard to define. Given the centre-right
party in the United Kingdom is called the Conservatives, are they not all
conservatives? The Democrats from the southern United States who opposed
segregation were regularly labelled conservatives, yet it would be wrong to see
Richard Russell Jr and Ronald Reagan as coming from the same political

5

For instance, the articles featured in the Princeton Companion to Atlantic History (2015,
Princeton University Press) are on the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
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tradition. The term “Movement Conservative” was adopted by some political
commentators to refer to Goldwater supporters in the sixties but given that
association, and its lack of relevance to the UK, it does not seem appropriate
either. Instead, this paper will utilise the terms of one of its subjects, William
Buckley Jr. Buckley distinguished between people who were broadly right of
centre, and those whom he supported and were part of what would become
known as the New Right via use of the capital “C.” Thus Gerald Ford and Michael
Heseltine were conservatives, whereas Jesse Helms and Margaret Thatcher
were Conservatives.
A monograph or even a doctorate which sought to investigate trans-Atlantic
aspects of the Conservative Movement would have a vast range of sources to
work with, ranging from think-tank publications to letters to representatives from
constituents. This paper, whilst considering governmental policy, will focus
heavily on two sources; the American Conservative magazine National Review
and London’s Spectator. It will attempt to use the two periodicals as a lens to
view the wider Conservative Movement. The aforementioned William Buckley
founded National Review in 1955 and according to Nash, the impact of the
magazine cannot be understated.6 National Review was not merely a
Conservative weekly; in many ways it launched the Conservative Movement. The
Spectator was less consistently Conservative as opposed to conservative, but by
the election of Margaret Thatcher had become solidly so with Charles Moore as

6

Nash, The Intellectual Conservative Movement in America since 1945, 29.
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editor. Crucially, these publications did not merely seek to talk to the public or
commentators. An important aspect of their existence was efforts to actually
influence policy.
A case could be made that the Salisbury Review, founded in 1982, is more of a
sister publication to National Review . However, drawing on another of Buckley’s
tropes, namely that one should back the most Conservative viable candidate; this
paper will mainly look at The Spectator owing to its more mainstream status in
British journalism. In addition, The Spectator was at its most Conservative in the
1980s with multi-millionaire Henry Keswick, husband of the head of one of the
New Right’s most significant think-tanks (The Centre for Policy Studies), as
owner. The Spectator reached the British right in the same way as National
Review did the American in terms of numbers, unlike the Salisbury Review.7
Furthermore, both National Review and The Spectator had the ability to attract
almost any Conservative to write for them, including both Thatcher and Reagan.
The centrality of these magazines to Conservatism in either country, combined
with their weekly publication, makes them excellent sources from which to draw
ideas about the nature of trans-Atlantic Conservatism.
How does looking at separate British and American weeklies allow for an
analysis of “trans-Atlantic elements?” There are three ways in which this analysis
will offer insight into the trans-Atlantic connections. Firstly, the degree of interest

7

Indeed, there was a National Review piece in this period dedicated to the defence of the
Salisbury Review (Joseph Sobran, “Mozart at the Piano”, National Review 38, no.10 (06/06,
1986), 54-55.)
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in and support for Conservative policies in the other country needs to be
investigated. Evidence of such interest and support would highlight connections
and echoes between the countries even if it does not prove genuine
entanglements. Secondly, the level of similarity in the political attitudes of the
newspapers will offer an insight into how connected Conservative political ideas
were. Did they spring organically in each nation with common circumstances or
were there common influences on the UK and US? Finally, and least significantly
for this paper, actual entanglements between the governments of either country
need to be briefly considered as they are the clearest instances of trans-Atlantic
interaction, even if they are not necessarily reflective of Conservatism more
broadly.
Conservatism with a capital “C” in this period can be broadly grouped into three
central themes. These three are nationalistic foreign policy, neoliberal economics
and traditionalist conservative social attitudes. This paper will not consider
foreign policy due to the saturation of analysis on the topic. Far more words have
been dedicated to British and American foreign policy in this era than to
connections between them domestically.
Within Neoliberal economics, supply-side economics in the form of reductions in
tax and spending needs to be considered, alongside Conservative support for
greater competition and opposition to privilege. How it is that these ideas were
tied into the writings and beliefs of neoliberal intellectuals and academics is
significant, and offers clear evidence for common influence on British and

13

American Conservatives. Given that the free market was the cornerstone on
which the Conservative Movement was first built economics are crucial to this
paper. What emerges is a predictable shared belief in the freedom of the
individual at the expense of the state, and a sense of market competition as
being both just and necessary. This latter point reflects a “bottom-up” attitude
which focused on consumer choice, as opposed to a mere defence of the rights
of the wealthy. Indeed, so significant was competition to Conservatives that the
desire for competition had influence beyond economics in both labour relations
and education.
The combination of traditionalist, Christian-based social values with
neoliberalism was an element of what made the Conservative Movement
distinctive and thus an analysis of Conservative views on social issues is
necessary. This paper will look chiefly at the topics associated with the “sexual
revolution”, namely gay rights, women’s rights and abortion. What this
demonstrates is that the focus on freedom in neoliberalism matched with
traditional social ideas to create a form of Conservatism which opposed RightsMovements but supported basic rights. Cultural liberalism was resisted, but
support for draconian legal restrictions on women or homosexuals were not
present (though abortion was considered separately).

14

Conservatives and the free market revolution
A study of the Conservative Movement in a trans-Atlantic context must feature
an attempt to examine actual entanglements between the major actors of the
Movement on either side of the Atlantic. Given their positions as the figureheads
of Conservatism on either side of the Atlantic, interactions between Thatcher and
Reagan and their respective governments must thus be considered even in an
analysis of the overall Movement such as this. This applies to the domestic
issues of taxation and spending as much as it does foreign-policy. Whilst
entanglements between the two were far more frequent over foreign-policy,
economic ones are more significant as they are more unusual.
In order to determine whether an incident, interaction or similarity between the
Thatcher and Reagan premierships is worth considering as an “entanglement” it
seems appropriate to utilise the significance granted it by contemporary
Conservative publications. As such, only a few of the numerous economic
discussions and statements made by either side about the other will be
considered here, but these incidents can speak for the period more broadly.
A National Review article on Thatcher’s premiership by Reagan himself
demonstrates the significance shared economic values and policies had in
strengthening his and Thatcher’s relationship.8 He writes glowingly of Thatcher’s
transformation of the British economy and suggests that he felt particularly

8
Ronald Reagan. "Margaret Thatcher and the revival of the west.” National Review 41, no. 9
(05/19, 1989): 21-22.
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strongly about it because it mirrored what he wished to achieve in the United
States. Indeed, he explicitly explains that he believes both he and Mrs Thatcher
were able to influence each other’s economic policy and those of other countries
such as Turkey and New Zealand, referring specifically to Thatcher’s
privatisations of industry and his own 1981 tax cuts. It is also worth noting
Reagan wrote this article in the middle of George H. W. Bush’s term as
President, at a point where he was starting to turn away from the economic
positions of the Reagan administration. Whilst certainty is impossible, there is a
suggestion that the narrative picture Reagan paints is designed at least in part to
contradict the more leftward policies of his predecessors and successor. The
significance of internal division within right-wing parties to Conservatives will be
considered in greater detail below.
The idea that Thatcher’s pursuit of radical economic transformation of the United
Kingdom influenced her American counterpart is supported by a 1983 “inside
scoop” Wall Street Journal editorial. 9 It explains that Reagan’s closest and more
conservative advisors have been pointing to Thatcher’s recent electoral success
(in early June 1983 the Conservatives secured a landslide election victory) to
ensure that Reagan sticks to his inclination to maintain his supply-side economic
policies. This suggests that senior American Conservatives were inspired by their
British counterparts, and also that Reagan himself placed relatively high priority
on events in the UK. Furthermore, the editorial itself is very keen on the idea that

9
The editor, “Inside scoop: The Thatcher Precedent”, Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition (6/24/,
1983): 9.
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Thatcher’s success shows that right-wing economic policies have the benefit of
being correct without the vice of bringing about electoral oblivion, suggesting that
“only liberal American columnists” claim it is not worth comparing the United
States and United Kingdom. British Conservatives also seem to have believed
that they had some influence over economic policy, or at the very least wanted to
have it. Within a week of each other Mrs Thatcher and her Chancellor Nigel
Lawson managed to make front page headlines by calling on the United States to
seek more fiscal discipline and reduce their deficit.10
Yet entanglements between figures are by no means the only evidence for transAtlantic influence and exchange in the economic ideas of the Conservative
Movement. An analysis of the major conservative newspapers of the era from
both the United States and United Kingdom shows great American and British
conservative interest in each other’s economic policies. Indeed, it is striking how
specific the interest is; there were more National Review articles featuring
discussion of British economic policy than the rest of Western Europe
combined.11
Similarly, The Spectator took a huge interest in Reagan’s economic policy, more
than any other nation, which is particularly striking given Britain’s common EEC
membership with most of the nations of Western Europe. Repeatedly, The

10

Anthony Lejeune, “Reagan and Thatcher: The Balance sheet,” National Review 40, no. 9
(05/13, 1988): 36.
11
Based on searching the EBSCO Host National Review Database for “Britain, or British, or UK”
and “economics” versus “economics” and “France, West Germany, Holland, Belgium, Sweden.”

17

Spectator and Salisbury review editorials lavished praise on Reagan’s economic
efforts, as did The National Review and Wall Street Journal on Thatcher. This
seems in part to reflect a Conservative predilection for an Anglo-American
alliance. As will be explored later in this paper, the 1980s was an age where this
tendency manifested itself as strongly as it ever had done.
Specifically, the interest was in the policies pursued by Conservative
governments. A review of the American economic coverage of British papers and
vice-versa highlights how significant supply-side economics was to
Conservatives in the eighties. Domestic pieces such as National Review ’s 1980
recommendations for Reagan, in which it called for a twenty-five percent top rate
of tax and a constitutional amendment to limit spending, were significant. 12 Yet
the number of articles singing the praises of or calling for more supply-side
economics in the other nation reveal that low taxes and spending were more than
sensible policy to Movement Conservatives in the United Kingdom and United
States. The Wall Street Journal ’s 1982 editorial in defence of Thatcher’s
monetary reforms,13 or its 1985 decrying of the influence of “wets” in moderating
Thatcher are excellent examples.14 So is The Spectator’s praise for the 1989 cut
in the American capital gains tax-rate.15 Such promotions of supply-side
economics show that not only did Conservatives want what they perceived to be

12

“Let’s see if it works”, National Review 32, no. 26 (12/31, 1980): 1548-1548.
Editorial, Wall Street Journal, eastern edition, (09/20, 1982).
14
Irving Kristol, “The Old World Needs a New Ideology.” The Wall Street Journal, Eastern
Edition (-03-06, 1985): 1.
15
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, The Spectator, 1989.
13
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best for their country, but also that they had a particular view of how societies
ought to be ordered. It went beyond a belief in what was the best economic
policy; they believed that the world would be a better place if personal income
was greater and government income less.
There was also major interest in the papers in opposition from within the right
itself rather than from the left. Indeed, Anthony Lejeune, the National Review’s
main British correspondent for much of the nineteen-eighties, dismissed Labour
as an irrelevance in his 1988 review of Reagan and Thatcher’s premiership,
emphasising that the opposition which mattered was predominantly from within
the Tory party.16
This is merely one example of a wider trend which applied in both directions
across the Atlantic. Ambrose Rose-Pritchard’s aggressive attack on Republicans
willing to compromise with Democrats over the budget in 1987 and 1990
Spectator articles shows that economic interest, even criticism, was focused on
fellow conservatives.17This focus highlights the Conservative Movement’s own
revolutionary nature. Having fought so hard to displace the compromising,
‘moderate’ economics of ‘patrician’ Tories in the United Kingdom and
“Rockefeller” Republicans in the United States, in the 1980s New Right
Conservatives were desperate to consolidate their position as the policy-makers
on the right. They appeared to be more concerned about winning this battle of

16

Lejeune, “Reagan and Thatcher: The Balance Sheet,” 12.
Ambrose Rose-Pritchard, “Can Reagan Add up,” The Spectator, (10/31,1987):9; James
Bowman, “How to liberate the millions,” The Spectator, (2/10, 1990): 12.
17
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ideas on the Right than they were about defeating the left. This engaged
sympathy for fellow hard-line Conservatives across the Atlantic; conservatives
saw their own battles reflected overseas. National Review’s Anthony Lejeune
made explicit comparison between the “wets” and “Rockefeller Republicans” on a
number of occasions, notably in his 1988 review.18 In part national context must
also be considered. Praise was lavished on Thatcher’s neoliberal economic
policies by National Review in 1983,19 the time when the primaries for the 1984
US election were just beginning to take shape. Similarly, Thatcher’s decision to
continue cutting taxes throughout her Premiership was emphasised by National
Review in 1990 when Congress was pushing for tax rises. As noted in the
introduction, these newspapers were set up to try and influence Conservative
politicians as well as to commentate on them. The trend for mistrust of
moderates on the other side of the Atlantic also reflects how powerful the transAtlantic connection was for Conservatives in the 1980s.
What this mistrust also reflects is the degree to which even amongst people who
would normally be considered as true Conservatives, supply-side economics
took a significant amount of time to become established. In the early 1980s a
number of pieces were published calling supply-side ideas into question, often
utilising H.W. Bush’s immortal phrase of “voodoo economics.” Arthur Slessinger’s
1980 critique of Thatcherism in the Wall Street Journal is a fine example. In his

18

Lejeune, “Reagan and Thatcher: The Balance sheet,” 12.
Anthony Lejeune, "All the Way with Thatcher?" National Review 35, no. 3 (02/18, 1983): 192209.
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piece he wrote of his worry that Reagan would follow Thatcher’s path of pursuing
principled economic policy which causes undue pain to the economy. He went as
far as to suggest that Thatcher was undermining British conservatism, writing,
“the worship of abstract principles is surely the antithesis of the British
Conservative tradition with its Burkean distrust of apriori theories.”20 Similarly, in
The Spectator in late 1981 Rees-Mogg warned of monetarism driving the
American economy into depression.21 The National Review London
correspondent of 1980 and ‘81 gave monthly reports of how British Tories are
attacking the “aggressive” capitalism being promoted by Mrs Thatcher. Yet by
1982 these articles dry up. From around the re-election of Mrs Thatcher in 1983,
the small numbers of criticisms that are offered about economic policy are
attacks on moderation in the name of political expediency.
These newspapers suggest that the economic attitudes of British and American
Conservatives swung fully behind supply-side economics at a similar time. That
this transformation happened in equal measure in the British and American
newspapers provides support for the idea that the Conservative Movement had
strong trans-national elements to it.

20

Arthur Slessinger, “The Thatcher Experiment,” The Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition (09/12,
1980).
21
William Rees-Mogg, “Reagan, monetarism and economic pain,” The Spectator, (10/24,
1981):11.

21

Conservatives, Competition and Choice.
Linked to economics, but at least partially separated from beliefs on taxation and
spending, was the fervent Conservative belief in competition and choice. Too
often, neoliberal economics have been explained as the reduction in the power
and size of the state and reductions in the individual tax burden. As stated in the
last section of this paper, reducing taxes and state power was undoubtedly a
goal not only of the Thatcher and Reagan governments, but of the New Right
more broadly. Yet this is only part of the story of neoliberal economics. A belief in
the moral correctness of competition, and conversely the wrongness of privilege,
was one of the critical ways in which the economic beliefs of the New Right were
‘New.’ In addition, this belief in competition and choice became a vital aspect of
Conservative ideology, driving ideas about public policy in non-economic areas
of social policy.
Part of the reason that competition was such a significant element of
Conservatism was the degree to which it had been discredited in the decades
before the nineteen-eighties. There had been a vast state-entry into the
marketplace and the presence of the state became the status quo. The power of
this status-quo is reflected in the level of opposition to Thatcher and Reagan’s
efforts to boost competition. It had become so tarred that the bulk of the left, as
well as many members of centre-right parties (Mrs Thatcher felt compelled to
sack half of her Cabinet within two years of taking office) became convinced that
support for competition was akin to a wish to destroy the welfare state. This belief
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did not simply disappear after 1980. In the UK the Church of England published
the report Church and the City which suggested that competitive markets were
leaving vast numbers to suffer. In the United States the mainstream press such
as the New York Times regularly offered case-studies about increases in
homelessness. It is important therefore to consider Conservative newspaper’s
support for competition within the context of vast criticism from political, religious
and lay elements of society.
The significance of competition to the early neoliberal intellectuals of the Mont
Pelerin Society was huge. The Mont Pelerin society in an international group of
academics, economists and intellectuals set up in 1947 to discuss means of
protecting human freedoms. In practice its focus is on free market economics
and almost every prominent neoliberal thinker of the twentieth century was a
member.
Rather than the destruction of what came to be termed the “welfare state”, it was
support for competition which was the most important idea to neoliberals. Ben
Jackson’s research into the neoliberal thinkers of the mid-twentieth century has
helped highlight this. He explains at length how it is wrong to suggest, as several
historians have done22, that neoliberalism was about dismantling the welfare
state. Their big concern was about reducing the encroachment of government,
not in eliminating government. Indeed, Hayek and his companions agreed that a
welfare system which sought marginal redistribution to the poorest in society was
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necessary.23 It is easy to forget that Walter Lipmann, the American progressive,
was a founding member of the Mont Pelerin society. Jackson suggests the
neoliberal thinkers of the ‘40s and ‘50s were not “reactionary and negative,” and
did not seek a return to nineteenth century laissez-faire economic policy. 24 He
points to Jewkes’ attack on laissez-faire in his Ordeal by planning in which he
suggests “the socialist attacks on the social rigidities and privileges of Victorian
England were sound.”25 The key word in that sentence is planning and this paper
will explore how neoliberal anti-privilege seeped into almost every element of
New Right ideology, both at the top and in the magazines.
Given the influence that these thinkers had on the New Right on either side of the
Atlantic what they argued is of vital concern to this paper. Jackson subsequently
suggested that this apparent moderation of the early academics was abandoned
by the New Right in the 1970s and that they sought a more fundamental
destruction of the welfare state that had been established following the Second
World War.26 This is where his analysis must be challenged. One of the striking
features of the Thatcher and Reagan governments was their willingness to allow
welfare to continue much as it had been before. Under both of them welfare
spending climbed by more than 10% during their time in office. Upon Mrs
Thatcher’s death, the former Cabinet Minister Kenneth Clarke appeared on
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television to suggest it was “ridiculous” to suggest the Thatcher government had
attacked the welfare state.27Whilst some historians have suggested this was a
failure on their part28, this actually seems to show that the neoliberal
governments of the 1980s followed their intellectual forebears in focusing on
competitive practice and government efficiency rather than fundamental changes
to the government’s welfare role. This attitude is reflected in the Conservative
newspapers of the era, with very few attacks on the government of either country
for not reducing the welfare bill. Indeed, the most notable area of comment on
welfare in the Wall Street Journal or National Review is praise for the Wisconsin
Governor Tommy Thompson’s W2 welfare programme. Thompson’s program
actually raised the cost of welfare, but it altered the system in a manner that
compelled people to work for their benefits. Here, we see the Conservative love
of competition at work. The great goal of this reform and its subsequent
descendants such as the New York program was to ensure that people were not
dis-incentivised from working.
The influence of neoliberal economists such as Friedman and Hayek on
governments is beyond doubt; both were recruited as advisors by Thatcher and
Reagan. The 1980s articles in The Spectator and National Review show that the
Conservative Movement as a whole was heavily influenced by them. A search for
abstracts featuring “Hayek” brings up more than 100 articles in both of these
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magazines,29 as well as over a thousand mentions in the Wall Street Journal.
The National Review’s Dinesh D’Souza actually has a 1989 article in which he
heaps praise on the neoliberal economists and complains about them not having
enough influence on government policy.30 The commonality of influence of these
neoliberal academics to Britain and America further highlights the strength of
trans-Atlantic entanglements in the Conservative Movement. Indeed, the Mont
Pelerin society was made up mainly from British and American based
academics, ensuring trans-Atlantic exchanges of ideas; exchanges which would
in later decades come to greatly influence the Conservative Movement.
Competition was a major neoliberal concern because, Jackson surmises, it was
vital from the perspective of freedom that people be allowed “to make rational
choices on an individual basis.”31 Choice was seen as a crucial element of
freedom and competition was necessary to ensure choice. Neoliberals wanted to
maximise competition not merely because it was felt to be the best guarantor of
economic growth, but because it guaranteed freedom. Jackson summaries
neoliberal economics as being “a critique of the threat to freedom posed by the
encroaching power of the state”32 and that power undermined competition. It is
also significant that support for competition was not merely a call for the state to
reduce its power. Rougier described his “true liberalism” as a creed where the
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government offered each ‘driver’ the Highway Code, in contrast to socialism
which ordered drivers where to drive and “Manchester liberalism” which offered
no code.33 In this context, it is possible to see how apparently anti-intervention
Conservative could introduce government regulation in industries which had
never seen it before.
A large element of New Right support for competition was support for the
reduction of government involvement in private sector trade. At a government
level Reagan and Thatcher sought to eliminate price-controls and instead allow
prices to fluctuate freely. A National Review article had actually called on Reagan
to eliminate numerous price controls including on gasoline as early as his
election in 1980.34Similarly, from a neoliberal perspective the cuts to various
forms of income tax were in part a means of boosting choice. Less taxation
meant the individual was freer to pursue his goals; he had greater choice. These
ambitions were almost universally supported by the Conservative commentariat.
Indeed, The Spectator attacked the Democratic Party on two key Conservative
bugbears in 1987, suggesting that their tax policy was designed to enforce “a
form of state enforced equality which reduces competition.”35 Later the same
year, The Spectator’s Washington correspondent Ambrose Rose-Pritchard wrote
of his frustrations at the rise in support for protectionism amongst Congressional
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Democrats, claiming that it undermined competition. 36 The best reflection of New
Right support for competition within the newspapers examined in this paper was
Michael E. Porter’s article explaining why competition was a great thing both for
the nation and even from the perspective of individual businesses. 37
Privatisation was an issue around which Conservatives congregated in this
period. It was an enormous issue in British politics, making it unsurprising how
much support is expressed for it on the pages of The Spectator and Salisbury
Review. Yet it also features heavily in American commentary, much beyond mere
reports of what the Thatcher government are doing. This reflects once again the
level of trans-Atlantic interest in Conservative economics and the power of New
Right ideology to transcend national boundaries (in certain contexts).
Significantly, a huge aspect of Conservative support for privatisation came from
the belief that it would create competition and boost the competitiveness of
struggling factories, dockyards and mines. Buckley spoke happily as late as 1990
of how the privatisation of a Belfast shipyard had seen it record its first year of
profit in fourteen years.38
The large government monopolies in utilities were attacked not merely for being
nationalised, but also for being monopolies. Indeed, some of the criticism of the
way in which British industry was privatised shows how critical a consideration
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competition was to Conservatives. The Spectator’s Martin Ivens specifically
asked in 1987 “What has it [privatisation] done to widen consumer choice….
what has it done to improve completion?” 39 To Ivens, simply removing things
from the government was not the aim of privatisation. He pointed to the sell-off of
British gas as one unit as a particularly heinous example of monopoly being
preserved, contrasting it with the competition of the US regional companies. The
Wall Street Journal expressed similar concerns about British privatisation a year
earlier in an article entitled “Tory Paradox.” 40 This rampant opposition to
monopolies amongst Conservatives had its roots as far back as the 18th century,
but the summary of the mid-twentieth century neoliberal Henry Simons that “the
great enemy of democracy is monopoly, in all its forms” helps to establish what a
crucial idea this was within neoliberal economics.41
This opposition to Monopoly was reflective of another critical element of
Conservative support for competition, which was that competition was anathema
to privilege. In the United States both left and right had long portrayed
themselves as opponents of privilege, but in the United Kingdom this had been
far less true on the right (and it could be argued, and was by the New Right, on
the left). A National Review article at the end of Mrs Thatcher’s final government
reserved particular praise for the way that competition had been injected back
into Britain at the expense of permanent privileges for the rich and Trade Unions.
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It noted with pleasure how “She has persuaded people that there is no virtue in a
badly run business”, praising how competition in enterprise was no longer seen
as an ill in the United Kingdom.42 Indeed, the same article suggested that
American Conservatives feel that American “enterprise culture” has spread to the
UK and assails privilege as the enemy of competition and “just” economics.
Bethell notes how Thatcher receives criticism from the left for her “replacement of
socialist privilege.” Critically, he also emphasises how Thatcherite economics has
displeased moderate, traditionalist conservatives such as Quintin Hogg and the
former Prime Minister Harold MacMillan. He suggests that the key reason for
criticism of Thatcher from both left and right is her assault on their privileges. The
“encroachment of the market economy” upsets many in “a country where the
advocacy of one variety of privilege (Tory) or another (Labour-Trade Union)
usually predominates.”43
The praise offered by American Conservatives to British competition provides yet
further evidence for trans-Atlantic interests amongst Conservatives. Furthermore,
Bethell’s description of the promotion of free market competition at the expense
of privilege as the introduction of an “American market order” offers an insight
into how American Conservatives viewed privilege as a British trait.
Opposition to privilege and belief in competition were also crucial aspects of
Conservative opposition to the power of Trade Unions. Tom Bethell’s use of the
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term “socialist privilege” is far from unique and this phrase is helpful in
understanding how Conservative opposition to trade-unions was not purely
partisan. 44They were not merely opposed to trade-unions because they were
left-wing groups; they saw the Trade-Unions as giving out special privileges to
their members, and in doing so denying free market competition. A Spectator
article from the early 1980s attacks “closed shop” arrangements in both the
British legal system and the City of London, suggesting that this presents an
unfair barrier to entry and undermines consumer choice.45 Paul Johnson attacked
a similar situation amongst the printers of Fleet Street, decrying “That great
social evil, the closed shop.” 46 Indeed, Johnson emphasises the connection
between a lack of competition and Union power, suggesting that the Fleet Street
closed shop “is a form of monopoly achieved by coercion.” Anti-Unionism was
similarly strong in American Conservative circles; there were almost as many
articles dedicated to the (perceived) Union scourge in National Review in the ‘80s
as there were in The Spectator. For example, in 1986 National Review ’s The
Week heaped praise on the fact the National Labor Board had suggested some
work could be shifted from unionised to non-unionised workers, saying
“Americans have more choice, and unions can’t handle it.”47 As with its British
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counterpart, National Review ’s opposition to Unions stemmed above all from its
support for greater competition.
Trade Unionism is an area of policy where these newspapers offer relatively little
in the way of trans-Atlantic opinions. Nonetheless, it remains important to this
analysis for two reasons. Firstly, the similarity of approach needs to be
recognised. Secondly, Trade Union policy is significant because it demonstrates
how important competition and opposition to privilege were to Conservatives in
this era. Arguments made about Unions in National Review and The Spectator
were consistent with the broader arguments made about competition and as
such show how similar this element Conservative ideology was on either side of
the Atlantic. From this one can extrapolate the common influence of the
neoliberal thinkers mentioned above.
Labour relations, whilst not strictly economic, serve a chiefly economic purpose.
Education on the other hand is certainly a social rather than economic area of
policy. That it too was impacted by the Conservative faith in competition is further
evidence of how powerful this idea was. In the United Kingdom, the Assisted
Places Scheme was introduced by the Thatcher government in 1980. Rather
than being compelled to attend their local state-run Comprehensive School,
pupils whose parents could not afford to send them to private schools had their
fees totally or partially paid for by the government if they finished in the top fifteen
percent of the entrance exam. It was a minor reform in terms of numbers, with an
average of around 6,000 pupils per year affected. Yet, the Assisted Places
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Scheme was more significant than the numbers affected both because it allowed
parents greater choice in education, and because it marked a clear break with
the previous trend of more Comprehensive schools. Competition was reflected
not merely in greater choice for the individual; the practice of rewarding the top
performing pupils with better schooling made the process of school choice itself
more competitive. The Scheme had wide-ranging support in The Spectator.48
In the United States a similar scheme in Wisconsin, like the W2 welfare program
introduced by Conservative Tommy Thompson, received huge support in
National Review based for most part on support for greater competition in
schools. National Review’s support for the scheme mostly took the form of
attacks on the teaching Unions and liberal commentators that opposed it, with
the accusation being that “The protestations...are perversely procedural and selfprotective.”49 It goes on to suggest that the government should not have a
monopoly on “public good” and that the public schools “fear the idea that people
should have a choice.”
It is noticeable how little role race played in this particular debate over school
choice. In the United States, unlike the United Kingdom, non-comprehensive
education gained an association with segregation owing to the suggestion by
some segregationists in the 1960s that allowing people to choose which schools
they sent their children to offered a way to avoid public school desegregation. Yet
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the National Review was not reacting to claims that the new Wisconsin scheme
was racist. It actually had relatively high support amongst liberal black legislators
because the provision which meant it aided only poor children meant it
disproportionately affected black families. Furthermore, because Milwaukee
(where the big majority of Wisconsin’s black population lived) was one of the
United States’ most residentially segregated cities, the school vouchers system
could not be interpreted as means of allowing white people to avoid sending their
children to schools with high minority populations. The residential segregation
meant that the desegregation of public schools had very little impact (black
neighbourhoods had schools with almost entirely black student-bodies and viceversa).
The basis of both British and American Conservative support for such schemes
was how they encouraged greater competition. Significantly, this was not done
through cuts to government funding for education provision. Rather, it was that
the funds were used in a manner which emphasised individual choice over that of
the governments. This is further vindication of Jackson’s argument that
neoliberalism was not merely a creed which set out to remove the state. Rather,
it was about controlling the state’s centralising and anti-liberal tendencies.
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Conservatives and the Sexual Revolution
A consideration of domestic aspects of American and British Conservatism must
also examine Conservative attitudes towards social issues. Indeed, it seems that
alongside foreign policy, it was the traditionalist social attitudes of Conservative
Movement acolytes and intellectuals which ensured the “Conservative
Movement” was about more than neoliberal economics in both the United
Kingdom and United States.
Historians of American Conservatism have granted far more prominence to
social issues such as women’s rights, gay rights, minority rights and law and
order than their British counterparts. The American “culture wars”, the battle
between right and left over social issues, have had much material devoted to
them.50 There is not a comparable tone on the history of the British right’s social
attitudes, though Michael McManus’ recent book on the Conservative Party and
homosexuality has offered greater insight into attitudes to gay rights.51 However,
as with so much of the existing literature on British Conservatism in this period, it
revolves specifically around the Tory Party rather than right-wing politics more
broadly.
The issues grouped under the “sexual revolution” are women’s rights, gay rights
and abortion. This area of analysis differs from the previous areas of supply-side
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economics and competition. Unlike in those areas, there are very few examples
of American articles discussing the British government’s social policies or viceversa. Indeed, there are relatively few in either newspaper relating to the policies
pursued by their own government. This seems to reflect two important factors.
Firstly, social issues were more culturally than policy-based to Conservatives in
the 1980s. They held power in both nations, but beyond minor reforms their chief
goal was to resist left-wing pressure for legislative reform. This meant in
particular that foreign newspapers commented a comparatively small amount on
social issues in other countries. The majority of foreign coverage in either the
National Review or The Spectator was dedicated to analysing actual government
policy. Secondly, and equally importantly, it seems to highlight how much less
revolutionary and remarkable Reagan and Thatcher’s social policies were than
their economic policies. Their economic policies, whilst coming in for occasional
criticism in Conservative newspapers for being too moderate, were such a break
with what had come before that they were always comment-worthy. By contrast,
the social policies pursued were unremarkable to the Conservatives who
dominated these newspapers.
This relative lack of direct interest in the policies of the other nation does not
mean that the social attitudes of these papers are insignificant to a Trans-Atlantic
history of the New Right. In Cooper’s comparison of Thatcher and Reagan he
notes that different “national contexts” meant the ‘trans’ element of his ‘trans-
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Atlantic’ history was partially limited. 52 Similarly, it is possibly fair to suggest that
the actual transfer of social attitudes across the Atlantic in this context was not
major. Nevertheless, the similarly traditionalist Conservative social attitudes
expressed in both The Spectator and National Review show the significance of
the connection between the United Kingdom and United States. That
Conservatives in both nations pursued neoliberal economics alongside traditional
Conservative attitudes towards family life, gay rights and abortion imply that the
neoliberal intellectuals who inspired the New Right had a similar effect in both
Britain and America.
Indeed, it is remarkable how in spite of significant differences in the two
countries, there was a striking similarity in the attitudes towards the “sexual
revolution” expressed in their respective chief Conservative periodicals, The
Spectator and National Review. America was the more religious country by far in
the eighties, church-attendance being more than twice as common.53 Williams
follows much American historiography of the ‘culture wars’ when he suggests
that they emerged owing to the remarkable religiosity of the United States and
the subsequent impact this had on the Right. If National Review alone expressed
robustly Conservative opinions on social issues then this thesis would carry more
weight, but the similarity of opinions in it to those in The Spectator suggests it is
somewhat lacking. Despite the different cultural contexts in Britain and America,
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there was major alignment amongst Conservatives on attitudes around the
sexual revolution and this is further evidence of trans-Atlantic connections within
the Conservative Movement.
The phrase “traditional Conservative” would be a reasonably accurate term to
describe the attitudes of both the British and American New Right to the sexual
revolution. However, this is in need of a qualification. The phrase could imply that
New Right social attitudes were at odds with a more ‘liberal’ economic attitude.
Rather, the study of the contemporary Conservative newspapers suggests that
whilst they had a traditionalist outlook to questions of the place of women or
wrongness of homosexuality, they separated their disapproval from clear policy
proposals. Thus in the view of Conservatives, their “toleration” of groups such as
homosexuals ensured a consistent valuing of freedom.
Within the New Right, traditional ideas relating to the family remained strong and
women’s rights campaigns were looked upon unfavourably. Gilder offered a
stringent defence of the traditional role of the family in society in his 1986 article
in National Review. He associates “feminists” and the “contemporary sexual
liberal’s goal of reproduction and the associated tasks becoming a societal rather
than particularly female role with the Marxist aim of society taking on the “general
production.”54 He emphasises the importance of mothers and makes the claim
that “The prisons, reformatories, foster homes, mental institutions and welfare
rolls of American already groan under the burden of children relinquished to

54

George Gilder, "The sexual revolution at home.” National Review 38, no. 19 (10/10, 1986): 30.

38

‘society’ to raise and support.” 55 In addition, Gilder attempts to combat the
arguments of Betty Freidan that women need greater opportunity. He quotes a
pair of sociological studies in the late ‘70s which suggested that suburban
housewives were amongst the least isolated Americans.56
The New Right’s conceptualisation of women’s rights campaigners as a left-wing
special interest is made clearer still in a mocking two-line National Review article
from 1985, in which the author suggests female affirmative action for the best
looking women (this being based on a study which found “beautiful women do
less well than plain ones in the higher echelons of business.”57 This anti-feminist
attitude is even clearer in The Spectator. Richard West writes numerous articles
of a similar vein to Gilder’s in the National Review, notably one where he jokes
that for British feminists “Not a day passes...without…. the production of new
sociological evidence of the nastiness of men.”58 Auberon Waugh is equally as
forthright in his protests against the “women’s rights lobby”, calling for all the
feminist “public bodies” to merge into the “National Organisation of
Madwomen.”59
Yet the articles on women’s Rights cannot be entirely summed up as male
attacks. There were several female writers at The Spectator decrying the
perceived extremism of the Women’s Right’s campaigns. One of them, Vicki

55

Gilder, The sexual revolution at home, 32.
Gilder, The sexual revolution at home, 31.
57
“The week,” National Review 37, no. 15 (8/9/1985): 12-16:
58
Richard West. “A liberated woman,” The Spectator, (20/02, 1981): 15.
59
Auberon Waugh. “Another Voice,” The Spectator, (10/31 1987): 8.
56

39

Woods, had an article which matches up closely to Gilder’s in National Review.
Like Gilder, Woods decries the decline of the family, pointing out that 85% of
divorced mothers will be on state benefits. Indeed, she explicitly lays blame for
the decline of the family and the blow this has caused children of divorce on the
“sexual revolution.”60
The attitudes expressed in British and American Conservative newspapers on
gay rights are almost identical. Of all areas, the articles focusing on homosexuals
most highlight the New Right combination of a small-statist attitude with fervent
moral beliefs. Two themes emerge; the Conservative emphasis on tolerance of
homosexuals as opposed to acceptance, and their hatred for the “gay lobby.”
Tolerance is the overriding theme in both The Spectator and National Review.
The difference between tolerance and acceptance is spelt out a number of times.
The Spectator suggests “it is odious for the law to punish homosexual acts
between consenting adults in private” but that this does not mean that
homosexuality is `valid' or even admirable.”61 Auberon Waugh, a stringent antihomosexual, also calls for tolerance in The Spectator by attacking those calling
for all clergy to have to reveal their homosexuality even when it is not interfering
with work.62
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Such sentiments are reflected in Short’s National Review piece in which he
argues that the left have determined one needs to declare one’s sexuality in a bid
to “politicize the bedroom” and tried to redefine tolerance as approval.”63 Short
argues that these efforts explain why no Conservative could support the “gay
rights movement”; he believes it is an attack both on privacy and sexual morality.
Evidently, the Conservative conception of freedom prized the right of individuals
to discriminate and suggested the government must merely tolerate, rather than
accept minority groups such as homosexuals.
Writing as though they could work for the same newspaper rather than ones
3000 miles apart Johnson and Buckley each offer damning verdicts on CBS’
original decision to suspend David Rooney for suggesting too many “homosexual
unions” was a problem for America. Whilst both defend Rooney’s statement, they
are more concerned with the supposed growing power of the gay rights
movement and the influence it can exert. Buckley suggests that rather than
anything to do with homosexuals themselves, “what is more portentous is that
the casual ascription of bigotry has become a routine part of American life.”64 Six
years earlier Colin Welsh had expressed similar fears about “the way in which
homosexual activists have, as I said, advanced boldly, immodestly, proselytising
and demanding ever new 'rights', privileges, ells and so on.”65 To these writers,
the gay rights movement was apparently synonymous with gay “privilege.” The
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closest that either paper came to a statement which calls for a policy relating to
homosexuals (as opposed to actively wanting no policy) was Taki’s call in The
Spectator for New York and San Francisco to close down their bathhouses. 66
Yet in the vast majority of cases the newspapers feature articles expressing a
general distaste for homosexuality and opposition to its entering the public
sphere, alongside a general toleration of its existence in the private sphere.
A remarkable aspect of the coverage of gay rights in either newspaper is the
consistency of the attitudes expressed in the writing. The only major change is
that AIDS becomes a more common theme as the decade goes on. Yet the
growing discovery of AIDS as being a disease which hits homosexuals most of
all did not trigger either a more sympathetic or harsher attitude to homosexuality
on either side of the Atlantic.67 The difference is that slightly more articles were
written about gay rights in the later eighties as the gay liberation movement grew,
with groups such as the Aids Coalition To Act Up gaining greater press traction.68
This interesting combination of traditional Conservative attitudes and neoliberal
freedom of choice did not exist with abortion. Abortion was perceived as falling
outside of such bounds because it was viewed as killing; no amount of toleration
could be allowed for killing.
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The starting position of Conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic was that
abortion was wrong in all circumstances. Richard Neuhaus expressed this view
in the National Review69 in 1989 and Mary Kenny the same in The Spectator in
1987.70 One of the major issues which both Britons and Americans wanted to
tackle was the presentation of abortion as a women’s issue. Neuhaus suggests
that it is a purely moral question of “the weighting of a human life against the
reasons for terminating that life” as opposed to a gender-related one.71 Likewise
a Spectator editorial in the run up to a major vote on term-limits at Westminster
tries to debunk the idea it is a ‘women’s issue’, noting that left-wing female
members of the press such as Polly Toynbee used this as a stock line, despite
polling showing that abortion is far more popular with men than women.72 The
way in which this issue was separated from others is well demonstrated by
Johnson’s expressed horror at the phrase “right to choose” on the grounds it
suggests that having children is merely another consumer choice. 73Given the
aforementioned significance of consumer choice to the Conservative Movement
this is particularly significant; abortion was outside the scope of capitalism to the
bulk of the New Right. Paul Johnson emphasised this in his attack on the phrase
“right to choose” being associated with abortion.74
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That said, Conservative commentators were not totally unaware of political
realities and as such there are examples of them compromising. Once again,
however, this applies in equal measure on either side of the Atlantic, with Kenny
noting what an improvement eighteen weeks would be on twenty-eight in the
United Kingdom and Buckley any kind of cut in the USA.75 Indeed, it is interesting
how politicised abortion was in both National Review and The Spectator given
that abortion time limits were unchallenged in the UK for a decade up to 1987
and it was deemed to be a judicial rather than legislative question in the USA
from 1973 to 1988.76 The relative lack of religious emphasis in either the United
Kingdom or United States also indicates that what was once a religious issue had
developed into a partisan one

Conclusion
Conservatives in the United Kingdom and United States had a great amount in
common during the nineteen-eighties. Reflecting the closeness of their
Conservative heads of governments, and the relative similarities in the policies
pursued by those governments, the writers in National Review and The Spectator
advocated very similar things throughout the period.
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The introduction set out three different ways to examine trans-Atlantic elements.
The first, namely interest in the policy of the other nation, was most clearly
reflected in economic policy, particularly policy relating to taxation and public
spending. Supply-side economics was probably the single biggest change that
the Thatcher and Reagan governments made, and thus perhaps it is unsurprising
that this comes across as the most overwhelmingly important aspect of
Conservatism in these newspapers. Both The Spectator and National Review
offered vast amount of column inches to support for supply-side transitions in the
other country, as well as even more in their own. What the difference in coverage
granted to foreign supply-side economics over issues such as labour relations or
social issues indicates is that Conservatives themselves saw this as the most
important issue of the day. Looking at how the two papers covered the other
country, it is apparent that from an Atlantic perspective radical economic reform
was what mattered most within Domestic policy. Conservatives in America cared
a great deal about economics in Britain; they were less concerned by education
policy.
What the analysis in this paper also highlights is how similar was the ideology of
Conservatives on either side of the Atlantic. The repeated emphasis on
competition in arguments relating to regulation, privatisation, trade union and
even education highlights how wedded most Conservatives of the era were to the
neoliberal ideas first put forward in the thirties and continually advanced by the
likes of Hayek. Even if they were not consciously aware of the fact, which the
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regular references to neoliberals suggests they were, the Conservative
columnists who dominated these newspapers were imbedded with neoliberal
ideas.
This is made clearer still by the passion expressed for the supply-side economic
reforms which were transforming both countries for most of the titular period.
Likewise, the almost identical attitudes expressed on the major social issues of
women’s rights, gay rights and abortion highlight how neoliberalism influenced
Conservatives. In this area the critical influence of neoliberalism was toleration.
The focus on freedom ensured that even the most hardline anti-homosexuals
such as The Spectator’s Auberon Waugh did not advocate reintroducing antisodomy laws. Rather, the focus of Conservative opposition became the “rights”
groups which sought greater recognition and more equitable representation in
the public sphere.
The focus on Conservative newspapers rather than politicians seems to be
particularly significant. Whilst they did wish to be influential and there were
obvious constraints of decency, The Spectator and Salisbury Review had no
electoral concerns. Therefore, the fact they focus on competition rather than
unwinding the welfare state and on rejecting the gay rights movement rather than
homosexuality itself is hugely telling. The ideological picture of Conservatives
which this paper paints of neoliberal economics combined with elements of
traditional conservatism and a libertarian streak is more believable because it is
based mainly on newspapers. If the lip-service paid by Conservatives to the right
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of homosexuals to practice privately was false, then one would expect to see
newspapers such as these calling for more radically anti-gay policies than they
did.
The level of inter-governmental entanglements and influences covered in this
paper were few, mainly because the vast majority were over foreign policy.
Those that did emerge domestically (based mainly on the knowledgeable
coverage of the two newspapers) were about economics. These showed that on
the practicality of supply-side economics if nothing else, there was clear transAtlantic influence. Reagan was boosted by Thatcher’s electoral success; it
boosted his faith in Reaganomics.
It appears that there were trans-Atlantic elements to the Conservative Movement
in the nineteen-eighties. These elements were not universal across different
sections of policy or attitude. Whilst there was indeed a striking similarity in the
views on domestic issues, including social issues, on either side of the Atlantic, it
was only in neoliberal economics where there is clear evidence of governmental
influence. In addition, it was neoliberal economics where active support for the
other country to adopt Conservative policies was noticeable. Neoliberal ideas
came from Hayek, Ropke and many others, and lacked national constraints. As
such they heavily influenced Conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic,
resulting in neoliberalism being the most powerful, though not the only, common
ideological feature.
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Liberal International? The American takeover of London’s Spectator
Newspaper 1859-1861.

London’s Spectator newspaper in the period 1859 to 1861 illuminates two major
elements of Anglo-American political relations. Firstly, it draws attention to how
America was looked upon favourably by British Liberals. It establishes that by the
late 1850s it was not merely radicals in Britain who looked benignly upon
America’s greater sense of classlessness and democracy. Secondly, it helps to
illustrate how Liberal Party and Democratic Party ideology overlapped in that era
of the nineteenth century. From early 1859 to early 1861 The Spectator was
remarkable because of its proprietors. They were a pair of London-based
Americans, Benjamin Moran and James McHenry. Moran worked in the
Buchanan Administration’s London office as Assistant Secretary to the Minister
to Great Britain. During this period the magazine’s American coverage was
turned on its head, with its former hostility to the Buchanan administration being
transformed into positive coverage bordering on the sycophantic.
The Anglo-American relationship is probably the bilateral relationship most
covered by historians. Numerous periods of the so-called “special relationship”
have been explored, ranging from investigations into the nature of British
influence on the earliest colonists in the 17th century to attempts to decipher the
nature of the Bush-Blair relationship. Comparatively little has been done
comparing political attitudes and ideologies in the two countries in the mid-
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nineteenth century. When analysis has been done, the focus has often been on
governmental rather than ideological relations, such as Lehmkhul and Schmidt’s
book.77 In their introduction to a collection of essays on Anglo-American relations,
Leventhal and Quinault suggest that “the national bias of each country’s
historiography and history curricula has ensured the neglect of Anglo-American
connections after the United States became independent of Britain.”78 Much of
the comparative political analysis of the nineteenth century has ignored the
period running up to the Civil War. For instance, Patricia Lee Skyes’ Presidents
and Prime Ministers attempts to see parallels between crucial liberal figures on
either side of the Atlantic, but skips from Andrew Jackson and Sir Robert Peel to
Grover Cleveland and William Gladstone. 79Similarly, Kelley’s The Transatlantic
persuasion: The Liberal-Democratic Mind in the Age of Gladstone mainly covers
the post-civil war period.80 Importantly, Kelley’s piece does address the
compatibility of Liberal and Democratic party politics, though mostly in the postcivil-war era and focusing mainly on Democratic admiration for Gladstone. There
has been too little scholarly attention paid to this connection with trans-Atlantic
focus often being on American Whig admiration for Britain.81 The Spectator from
1859 to 1861 helps to illustrate how similar Liberal values in Britain were to
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Democratic ones in America, though this was complicated by slavery. During
Buchanan’s Presidency, despite the ideological overlap, British Liberals tended
actively to oppose Buchanan because of his anti-abolitionist position, The
Spectator was unique amongst Liberal papers in its support for him.
In the late 1850s both American and British politics had recently undergone
major political realignments. In the first part of the decade the American Whig
party had collapsed and the opposition to the Democratic Party became greatly
fractured, with the nativist and anti-Catholic Know-Nothings emerging alongside
other regional parties. The Democratic Party was the most successful of the era
and James Buchanan was elected on the Democratic ticket in 1856. By 1858 the
anti-slavery Republican Party had become entrenched as the Democrats’ main
rivals and the question of slavery policy was dominating American politics.
American politics became more sectional because of this. Whether a
congressman was a southerner or northerner, an abolitionist or slaver, came to
matter more and issues such as immigration, trade and taxation became less
salient as slavery and the existence of the Union came to fore. In the 1850s,
based on DW Nominate scores, this sectionalism became the greatest predictor
of how a Congressmen would cast their votes.82 Buchanan sought to maintain
unity in the country which was bitterly divided over the slavery issue. He failed to
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do so and the slave states became increasingly alienated, eventually seceding in
1861 with the Republican Abraham Lincoln’s victory in the Presidential election.
British politics in the era was chaotic also. Party labels had always been less
meaningful in Britain, with no official parties on ballots and Members of
Parliament choosing the group with which they wanted to be associated. The
withdrawal from the Conservative block by Prime Minister Robert Peel and one
hundred of his allies in 1846 had further complicated matters, leading to a series
of brief governments under various banners. A sense of stability returned as the
Liberal Party emerged as a dominant force in the late 1850s, becoming a formal
group in 1859. The Liberals were broadly the party of greater representation for
non-elites, free enterprise and opposition to privilege, in contrast to the
Conservatives who sought to maintain the existing social and religious order.
The Spectator was founded in 1828 by Robert S. Rintoul. He would go on to be
proprietor-editor for thirty years. It had a Liberal outlook from the start, a notable
early example of this perspective being its demands for the passage of the Great
Reform Act with the legendary headline “the bill, the whole bill, and nothing but
the bill.”83 From the beginning it was a success, the 1857 Newspaper Press
Directory describing it thus: “This journal, for twenty-seven years, has occupied a
leading position amongst the weekly press of the metropolis.”84 The magazine
has had remarkable longevity, currently being the longest continuously publishing
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English language magazine in the world. Its politics shifted in the late nineteenth
century however and it is now by far Britain’s best known weekly magazine with a
conservative political outlook.
Yet despite the remarkable longevity there have been relatively few attempts to
analyse its history. Two articles and a monograph provide the bulk of the
historiography,85 with the occasional reference in press histories. The period of
American ownership which this paper will seek to address is an especially
notable hole in the history of the newspaper because William Beach Thomas was
not aware of it when he wrote his monograph on the first century of the
magazine. Malcolm Woodfield refers to the period but focuses on a subsequent
proprietor. Richard Fulton’s article is the only major piece on this intriguing period
in the newspaper’s long history.
In late 1858 the London press was, with the exception of the Times, critical of the
Buchanan administration. Buchanan’s refusal to take a hostile view of slavery
was anathema to most of the British press. There was also a sense that the
growing sectional resentment in the United States was down to a lack of
leadership on the part of Buchanan.86 At this time The Spectator came up for
sale and via a proxy in the form of The Spectator writer Thornton Hunt two
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Americans were able to purchase the paper for 4,200 pounds. Significantly, the
President who was receiving the hostile press was James Buchanan, the
previous Minister to Great Britain and the man whom Moran had first served as
secretary.87
The Buchanan administration’s paper in London
That McHenry and Moran’s ownership of the newspaper transformed its
coverage of Buchanan’s Presidency is undoubtable. The shift in the paper’s
attitude towards the President from the final pre-American ownership issues in
late 1858 and the start of their proprietorship was remarkable. Before the
Americans took over the paper The Spectator was damning in its criticism of
Buchanan. Detailed policy criticisms were few, but it offered stringent objections
to the power of slavery in American politics. In late 1858 it took delight in noting
how the policy of Buchanan “will be reversed by any successor” and that “Public
opinion has pronounced against it” at the Congressional elections.88 A few weeks
beforehand The Spectator accused the executive branch of the American
government of being “at the orders of the southern oligarchy” and generally
deserving of scorn for damaging the liberty which had previously defined
America.89 One of the final issues before the ownership changed hands was the
Christmas Day edition of 1858 in which Buchanan’s State of Union Address was
described. It was dismissed as “verbiage” and it was claimed that “never before”
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had the tool of “regular elections” been used to emphasize the frustration of the
people during a “Chief ruler’s” reign. 90 This was a reference to the losses
sustained by Buchanan’s Democratic party in the Congressional elections of
1858.
The hostility of these articles make the subsequent pro-Buchanan slant of The
Spectator under McHenry and Moran all the more apparent. Compare the
aforementioned reaction to his State of the Union address in late 1858 to that of
1859. Reporting on it in early 1860, The Spectator argued “The Message
delivered to Congress on the 27th of December is a document of unusual
ability.”91 The magazine was consistently and aggressively pro-Buchanan. When
a Congressional Committee was investigating him for potential corruption, the
paper dismissed them as partisans, claiming “It must be borne in mind that in all
countries whose Government is based upon a popular suffrage, whether in
Europe or America, it is the custom for the opposition or " the outs,' to attack the
Government.”92 In the same article Buchanan was hailed as “that President who
has alone displayed the capacity, the courage, the will, and the elevated national
virtue, to administer the affairs of the Republic for the Republic.”93 The paper
claimed that Buchanan’s pro-union, anti-abolitionist leadership was rescuing
America in a time of potential crisis. In similar circumstances the following year
they expressed sympathy for Buchanan and hostility to John Covode and the
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committee on public expenditure on which he had taken a leading role in
publishing a report accusing the President of wrongdoing.94
Enemies of Buchanan’s of course were not limited to Opposition or Republican
politicians. He broke with fellow Democrat Stephen Douglas and what Kenneth
Stampp refers to as the “Young America” wing of the Party.95 Young America
was a strongly nationalistic, northern group of the Democratic party who, whilst
not abolitionist, was less wedded to supporting slavery than Buchanan. They
were contrasted with doughfaces; northerners like Buchanan who supposedly
had southern principles. The Spectator under Moran and McHenry decried the
disunity in the Democratic Party, but it attributed no blame to Buchanan. It
pointed to “Judge Douglas” as a culprit, a man had who had “a peculiar personal
ambition” which led him “to speculate in a policy of hostility to Mr. Buchanan.”96
The paper went a step further in their coverage of the 1860 election, accusing
Douglas of having “seceded from his party” unlike the “purely Democratic
candidate” Breckenridge.97 The paper also attempted to downplay the
significance of Douglas and his allies within the party, referring to him as “a
demagogue, and the leader of a small section of the Democratic Party” (in fact
Buchanan had won nearly thirty percent of the popular vote to Breckinridge’s
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eighteen).98 According to The Spectator Buchanan was a standout president:
“We believe, however, that we are simply stating a fact when we say that Mr.
Buchanan's immediate predecessors had not altogether reached the standard
which he has restored.”99
Seemingly out of support for the Buchanan administration the paper was
determined to downplay the chances of secession. Following Lincoln’s election,
they suggested he would in reality pursue a moderate course and that the
doomsayers predicting the end of the Union were worrying far too much, as
proven by the success of the Constitutional Unionist Bell in some upper southern
States.100 A week before the South Carolinian Senators resigned their Senate
seats The Spectator ruled out the possibility of secession.
The pro-Buchanan shift of the newspaper cannot be said to reflect a general
move in his favour either in British liberal circles or amongst the London Press.
This is perhaps best reflected by the first issue after the Americans McHenry and
Moran sold The Spectator to Meredith Townsend. Having been steadfastly
defended in the January 5th and January 12th editions of The Spectator,101 under
new ownership the paper panned him, referring to him as “The American
Bourbon.” It declared of secession “For this fearful complication no man is more
answerable than Mr. Buchanan.” They went on to suggest that if Buchanan had
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shown this “small amount of determination...four months ago” he “might have
saved the union” and “would have saved his reputation and the honour of the
national flag”, the implication being that both were ruined. 102
Before the Americans sold the newspaper in early 1861 The Spectator was
possibly more pro-Buchanan than any newspaper in the United Kingdom or
United States. The British press, except The Times, had been lined up against
him throughout his time in office. He had never been able to count on much of
the Northern Press in the USA and as the crisis of southern separatism got
worse he lost his tepid southern support also.103 Supporters of slavery
expansion, abolitionists and all of those in between could agree that Buchanan
had either acted wrongly or failed to arrange a compromise to keep these diverse
groups together. Yet The Spectator continued to present him as a valiant figure
doing all he could in the face of adversity and treachery, claiming “secessionists”
had “warped the conduct of Mr. Buchanan.”104
Why? Moran’s diary gives a clear indication that he held Buchanan at least
partially responsible for the impending collapse of the Union, stating “I am at
times disposed to look upon this great evil as the work to a large extent of Mr.
Buchanan.”105. One can infer that it was one or a combination of personal,
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partisan, professional and patriotic reasons. Moran had been under-Secretary to
Buchanan when the latter had been the Minister to London and was also a
Pennsylvania Democrat. He continued in the role under Buchanan’s successor,
meaning that throughout his period as an owner of The Spectator he was
working for the State Department in London, giving him both professional and
patriotic connections to the administration. Moran’s diary entry of January 9th
partially hinted at the power of his personal links to Buchanan, stating that The
Times’ decision to charge Buchanan with the destruction of the Union “is not
unfounded” but that he had “ever loved Mr B.”106

Was Fulton Right?
It has been established that under the stewardship of McHenry and Moran The
Spectator was exceptionally pro-Buchanan. Indeed, Ricard Fulton claims “From
early 1859 to early 1861, The Spectator’s commentary on American affairs read
like a Buchanan administration propaganda sheet.”107
Fulton’s piece is largely informative and insightful. However, two aspects of his
conclusion seem to rely too heavily on speculation and ought to be challenged.
Firstly, Fulton contends that the American ownership of the newspaper was “one
small dimension of how the Buchanan administration tried to influence the British
government, into a sympathetic view of the administration’s policy toward slavery
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and the Southern independence movement.”108 There is a distinct lack of
evidence directly linking the Buchanan administration to Moran’s joint ownership
of The Spectator. Probably, it was a personal enterprise.
Fulton does not present any evidence regarding the acquisition from a member
of the Buchanan administration beyond Moran’s own diary. Furthermore, Moran’s
partner McHenry was an American businessman in London unconnected to the
administration. Fulton did have access to the diary of George Dallas, the former
vice-president who was the American Minister to Great Britain whom Moran
served as assistant secretary in this period. There was no indication of contact
from Washington regarding buying a British paper. He does reference Moran’s
diary statement in 1858 that “we are now without a journal in England, except the
Times” in regard to the question of slavery.109 If this suggests anything significant
it seems to be that Moran was a believer in the Buchananite position of granting
concessions to the south over slavery. This could be drawn upon as evidence
that genuine partisan political feeling made him want to influence the British
press via a newspaper.
The other claim of Fulton’s which should be challenged is that “owning The
Spectator clearly paid political dividends to the Buchanan administration.” What
were these political dividends? Fulton argues they were twofold. Firstly, that the
many important liberals who read the magazine would have been influenced by
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its “American direction,” 110 and secondly that The Spectator coming out fervently
against the abolitionist cause and in favour of Buchanan influenced the rest of
the British press. One problem with both of these theories is that there was rarely
more than one article a week discussing American politics and on many
occasions, including the first two weeks of American ownership, none at all. It
seems even less probable that the American government would take the effort to
arrange the purchase of a paper only to have it regularly ignore American affairs.
He paraphrases Alvar Ellegard’s description of Spectator readers, writing that
they were “liberal in politics, MPs, peers, professional people, and businessmen,
both in England and the colonies- in other words, the decision-makers and
opinion makers of the realm.”111It seems fanciful to suggest that one of many
prominent weekly papers (alongside a number of dailies and semi-regular radical
pamphlets) could have had much of an influence. The Liberal MPs reading the
paper would have been reading other papers too. Furthermore, we do not know
the circulation of the paper, only that it declined under Moran and McHenry’s
ownership based on Moran’s diary entries112 and Beach Thomas’ very bare
summary of the period.113
The idea there was a shift in the London Press on slavery thanks to The
Spectator is also challengeable. He acknowledges that The Times was the only
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other paper to support the relatively pro-slavery position of Buchanan.114 Thus
his claims regarding influence on other papers, which he acknowledges are
“coincidence, possibly” rely on a particular example of the Saturday Review
moderating their criticisms of the administration from 1859 to 1860 and then
returning to criticise it once The Spectator was sold. Yet The Spectator was sold
at the same time as the Civil War was breaking out; every British newspaper was
condemning the Union government and getting behind the southern rebels.

Liberals and America
Party labels were self-applied in Britain until the 1880s and the first formal
meeting of the Parliamentary Liberal Party was in 1859. What historians refer to
collectively as the Liberal Party was thus largely loose and varied collection of
self-styled Whigs and Radicals. Even after its foundation in 1859 it was
significantly less defined and organised than either of the main American parties.
Broadly, Radicals were more fervent advocates of change and opponents of
privilege. Whigs generally advocated steady reforms to the constitution, whilst
Radicals called for immediate changes to be made in favour of greater
democracy. Radicals also tended to come from a more evangelical, non-Anglican
religious background. Whilst Radical continued to be a label attributed to
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politicians throughout the nineteenth century, by the late 1850s almost all Whigs
and Radicals referred to themselves as part of the Liberal Party. Liberalism in
this era was defined by support for a small state and a reduction in governmentbased privileges. As such Liberals, whether they came from a Whig or Radical
background, supported low taxation, low public spending, tolerance of religious
dissenters and above all free trade. These values made them and the American
Democrats natural bedfellows.
The Spectator was in the late 1850s very much a part of the Liberal mainstream.
Beach Thomas’ history of the paper emphasises that it was always a relatively
unpartisan Liberal paper, noting how when it was started in the 1830s it “backed
the Whigs when they pursued the course of justice and good sense, and roundly
abused them for any sign of back-sliding.”115 The former Whigs and Radicals
(plus some Peelites116) were all now part of the Liberal party. The Spectator had
offered support to elements of all three of these of groups previously and was
clearly supportive of the Liberal Party in this era and the few years preceding it. It
could thus fairly be said to be in the mainstream of British Liberalism.
In Spectator articles about the United States not overwhelmingly concerned with
partisan issues (which focused on support for Buchanan) there was a strong proAmerican emphasis. Part of this played to nationalistic concerns, emphasising
that America and Britain shared a common heritage and race. The Spectator
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endorsed Richard Cobden’s claim that “in the event of any danger to this country,
nothing could prevent the great bulk of the population in the United States
hurrying to the rescue of the old mother-country.”117 There were also numerous
allusions to the importance of the nation’s common Anglo-Saxon heritage and its
role in political culture, for instance in September 1860 an article contrasted
Mexican’s “foreign habits in their political affairs” with the upstanding nature of
the “Anglo-Saxon Republic” of the United States.118
The Spectator also shows how there was a great deal of Liberal admiration for
America’s more democratic politics. There has been considerable scholarly
attention paid to American Whig admiration for the moderation of the British
constitution by the likes of Howe.119 Sexton suggests that Whigs “could not
conceal their admiration of Britain.”120 There has been less attention paid to the
positive attitude of British Liberals toward America. Quinault suggests
“Americans regarded British politics as aristocratic, whereas Britons thought
American politics were democratic.”121 This seems to be accurate but does not
fully explain the situation. Because of these stereotypes, the more aristocratic
American Party (the Whigs and their descendants) and the more democratic
British party (the Liberals) looked longingly across the Atlantic. The famous
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British writer Trollope addressed the phenomenon in his 1867 political novel
Phineas Finn, in which the arch-liberal Turnbull was described, among other
things, as having “almost idolatrous admiration for all political movements in
America.”122 When British attitudes have been considered, they have tended to
focus on earlier Radical admiration for the United States’ supposed
classlessness and egalitarianism. Epstein notes how powerful the idea of
America as a land of liberty remained for British radicals in the 1840s, suggesting
that for them, “America remained a place of dreams, of populist yearning. The
vision of the western republic based on the free yeoman farmer- free from
religious, economic and social controls- died hard.”123
Yet The Spectator’s stated admiration for various elements of American politics
and political history between 1858-61 shows that by then fondness for the United
States was a Liberal trait, not merely a radical one. The Spectator noted how the
American revolution was inspired by English history, suggesting “We can
scarcely understand how General Washington could have been trained to his
great duties, if he had not had the precedent of Cromwell."124 They went on in
that issue to endorse the principles of the American revolution, stating “the most
loyal Englishman…..can scarcely blame the American citizens because they
construed the British Constitution better than King George and his Ministers
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did.”125 The paper did not merely accept that the Americans were within their
rights to rebel against British rule, but also praised the United States as a major
positive influence on the case for reform in Britain, stating “we have some
difficulty in defining the amount of debt which our Reform agitators owe to those
who so well illustrated Constitutional principles in the British Colony across the
Atlantic.”126
The Spectator’s overwhelmingly positive coverage of the United States (when not
considering partisan political questions) did not reflect a radical attitude at the
paper from 1859-61. As stated, it was a paper in the mainstream of British Liberal
politics. Nor was it merely a reflection of the biases of its owners, as was its
support for Buchanan.127 Rather, it is evidence of how “Americanised” the Liberal
Party of the late 1850s had become. What had once been considered radical
positions on the franchise were now in the Liberal mainstream and this meant
that the more democratic United States was viewed in a positive light by almost
all Liberals.
One of the most significant elements in the formation of the Liberal Party was the
decline in the influence of the aristocratic Whig attitude which emphasised the
need for strict franchise restrictions. It is not that these aristocratic Whigs
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disappeared from the party, a useful illustration of this being that the first two
Liberal Prime Ministers were Viscount Palmerston and Earl Russell. Rather, what
were once exclusively radical demands for wider suffrage permeated the party so
that from the mid-1850s franchise expansion was supported by the vast majority.
Every Liberal government from 1859 until 1922, attempted to pass a bill which
expanded the size of the British electorate.
Thus a more “American” attitude favouring wider political representation was
dominant within British Liberalism as a whole. It became common to associate
Liberal and American attitudes on the subject. . The Conservative Party leader
Disraeli suggested Gladstone’s 1866 Reform Bill, which sought to reduce the
property qualification for voting, was an attempt to replace the British constitution
with an American one.128
The Spectator shows that representation was not the only issue where Liberal
and American values overlapped. In common with the entirety of mainstream
American politics in the era, it criticised various forms of “direct taxation,”
expressing concern at the level of both property and income tax and expressing
the hope that Britons would not “endure a heavy burden of direct taxation after
our defensive labours shall have been completed.”129 In the United States the
direct taxes The Spectator opposed were not merely unpopular but
unconstitutional. Whilst offering broad praise for Gladstone’s 1860 budget it
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expressed concern that he had maintained income and property taxes while
abolishing various indirect taxes.130 Furthermore, in late 1859 they criticized a
radical proposal to reform the system of taxation and base it entirely on the value
of property owned by an individual. They insisted that a just tax system was not
merely based on extracting the most out of those with money, but on people
paying for what they used. What would later be termed laissez-faire
predominated.131

Liberals and Democrats
The Spectator combined a strongly partisan, pro-Democratic party attitude with
support for Liberal politics. That these elements were able to co-exist without
ideological contradictions or even much tension is a strong indication that there
was an ideological closeness between these two political movements. Indeed,
the only volte-face made by The Spectator in the aftermath of the takeover
McHenry and Moran was in its coverage of Buchanan and the sectional conflict
which dominated American politics at the time. At the least this indicates that the
Democratic and Liberal movements were not natural enemies.
The Spectator’s combination of support for Buchanan and Liberal politics in
Great Britain supports the theory put forward by the likes of Kelley that the
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American Democrats and British Liberals were ideological bedfellows.132 The
Spectator’s attitude to the significant issues of representation, taxation, public
spending, and public morality shows that Liberals and Democrats shared a good
deal of common ground. Central to both parties’ ideology was a belief that there
needed to be firm limits on the power of the state, on the influence of elites and
that the popular will ought to have great influence of political affairs. They also
had a shared belief in keeping public spending and taxation low, as well as
scepticism of the government pursuing great moral crusades. Although their level
of commitment to free trade was unequal, they were also both the antiprotectionist parties in their respective nations.
Howe has noted how historians have identified a “common liberalism” between
the two nations, in particular focusing on the admiration for Gladstone from many
American Democrats and for Edwardian New Liberals by the Progressive
Republicans of the early twentieth century.133 Sykes is an excellent example. She
argues that all successful, “conviction style” leaders in both the United Kingdom
and United States “articulate similar ideas, ones that adapt liberal ideology to suit
changing circumstances.”134 Whilst history has focused on later leaders, there is
also evidence for Liberal ideas and sympathies crossing the Atlantic in the mid19th century. James Epstein, examining the British press coverage of the death of
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Andrew Jackson in 1845, noted how much positivity there was for him from
radical papers such as the Northern Star, which portrayed him as a heroic man of
the people. Their obituary depicted him next to the recently deceased former
British Prime Minister Earl Grey and invited readers to contrast the two men in an
editorial entitled “The Republican and the Aristocrat contrasted”, in which they
sang the praises of the Democratic President and the political system he
endorsed which “invests sovereignty in the people .135 By contrast, the more
conservative paper the Globe condemned him for surrendering to the populace’s
“universal thirst for an actual share in power”, leaving America to resemble
ancient Athens. Here once again the complicated origins of British Liberalism are
in evidence. Significantly, it was the radical attitude to sovereignty which came to
dominate British Liberalism.
On occasion the policy beliefs of the two parties slightly differed. Yet they shared
resoundingly similar views. In his work on the American Whig Party, Howe notes
how the American Review described the two main American political parties in
1846: “There is a law and order, a slow and sure, a distrustful and cautious partya conservative, a Whig party; and there is a radical, innovating, hopeful, boastful,
improvident and go-ahead party- a Democratic, a Loco-Foco Party!”136 This
dichotomy is one which Howe and Holt are both keen to emphasise. Howe
rejects the term “liberal” regarding American Whigs based on their “moral
absolutism, paternalism and preoccupation with discipline” but is happy to use
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“conservative.” There is a wealth of evidence to support Howe’s case. The
eighteenth century Tory Lord Bolingbroke137 was an inspiration to Whigs and the
future Republican Secretary of State Seward was able to rouse a Whig meeting
by evoking Bolingbroke’s authority on the need “to regenerate the first principles
of the constitution.”138 Howe suggests both that the “decline of deference” felt
threatening to Whigs and that their fondness for Burke showed “how important
their conservatism was to them.”139 Ronald Quinault is keen to point out that
whilst historians such as Laski and Basler speak of Lincoln as one of the key
figures in the nineteenth century Democratic tradition, Lincoln at no point
referenced Democracy in a speech or writing and in 1836 endorsed a tax-based
franchise that excluded many.140 This evidence adds to the case that a major
aspect of American Whiggery was to conserve the existing order, a goal which
had always existed in British Toryism but which Robert Peel’s Tamworth
Manifesto of 1834 made an explicit goal of the British Conservatives. He
explained it as a response to a fear of “a perpetual vortex of agitation.” A
potential challenge to the relevance of this apparent association is that the Whigs
had ceased to exist for several years by the time Moran and McHenry took
charge of The Spectator. Yet here, in Lincoln and Seward, there are examples
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from the first Republican President and his greatest rival for the primary and
Secretary of State. This is an illustration of how influential former Whigs were in
the new Republican Party. Most Republicans had been Whigs and the majority of
Lincoln’s cabinet were ex-Whigs. Whilst not a direct continuation, the
Republicans were on the same side of the political divide as Whigs on most
issues.
Fiscal policy is another area where The Spectator highlights the ideological
similarity of Democrats and Liberals. In both its British and American coverage
the paper calls for governments to be more restrained in their spending. The
paper praised Buchanan’s call in his state of the Union Address of 1859 for
American public spending to be curtailed.141 It was also totally consistent in its
calls for British public spending and taxation to be kept low. When the
Conservative Party was briefly in power under the leadership of Lord Derby at
the start of 1859 The Spectator launched an attack on Disraeli’s “miserable”
budget, concurring with John Bright’s attack on the government’s 711 million
pounds of revenue from taxation as being too high.142
The Spectator under Moran and McHenry draws attention to how laissez-faire
attitudes to economics predominated in the British Liberal movement of this era.
That was this combined with an aggressive support for James Buchanan and the
Democratic Party, without desperate explanations for policy differences being
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necessary (his policies were pretty consistent with what The Spectator advocated
for the British economy), draws attention to the ideological consistency of the
Democratic and Liberal parties.
The Spectator reflects a non-moralising style of politics which came to dominate
the mainstream of the Liberal Party. They shared the Democratic party’s more
laissez-faire attitude to governmental moral restrictions. The paper offered a
freedom-centred defence of boxing (at the time a sport with strict restrictions),
arguing that “Sayers and Heenan will fight, it is certain” and decrying “the
busybodies” who “hunt them from county to county.”143 The paper’s support for
the bill against Church Rates was argued not from an anti-establishment (of the
Church of England) position but rather on the grounds people should not be
compelled to pay for something they do not believe in: “it is a proof of obstinate
infatuation to argue that Dissenters should be compelled to pay for the support of
a Church from which they have seceded for conscience' sake.”144 In its support
for the rights of the individual over the state as a moral arbiter on religious and
moral issues, The Spectator shows that the Liberal mainstream’s attitude to such
issues resembled those of the Democratic mainstream. The Democrats were the
party which Catholics turned to prevent Yankee evangelical dominance of
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education and civil society.145A laissez-faire approach predominated, as it did on
fiscal policy.
This also suggests that ethno-cultural historians such as Hays and Holt have
under-valued ideology in their analyses of ethno-religious question and
politics.146 The religious make-up of the Democratic and Liberal parties was very
different, yet their opposition to state-support for religion was similar as was their
lack of interest in pushing policies based on religious moral positions, such as
restricting vices. This cannot have been culturally based. The radical, nonconformist wing of the Liberal Party had a great deal in common religiously with
the Republican Party and there were very few Catholics or anti-confessional
Protestants (who made up the bulk of the Democratic Party) in Britain. Thus the
commonality of Democratic and Liberal moral and religious policy can be put
down to a common ideological perspective rather than cultural links.
Free trade was one of the defining features of Liberal politics in this era. It was a
policy which united all of the disparate groups of the Liberal Party together. Thus
it is unsurprising that The Spectator was a resolute supporter of free trade from
the late 1820s until deep into the twentieth century. The paper admitted in 1860
that “For our own part, we do not hesitate to say that we look upon free trade as
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a benefit which can never be carried to excess.”147 They also launched a
stringent attack on ship-owners who were “asking for hostile tariffs.”148
In spite of Franklin and other founding fathers advocating free trade, it was a
policy which divided America and the mother country for most of the nineteenth
century.149 The Democrats of the late 1850s were not avowedly antiProtectionist. Howe notes how a number of historians who have argued for a
common liberalism between the United States and Britain in the nineteenth
century have focused on Democrats’ regard for Gladstone, but suggested that
“this mutuality fell short of common adherence to free trade.”150 Howe draws
attention to free trade links between the two countries, focusing on American
societies such as the Philadelphia Free Trade Convention and writers such as
W.C. Bryant as evidence of how a free-trade movement was maintained in the
US.151 The Spectator provides primary evidence of this. In its reports of Richard
Cobden’s 1859 trip to America it notes how the “touching attentions” he received
whilst being known as the “great champion of free trade” show that “rightly
represented, free trade finds in free America no ungenial welcome.”152
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Yet Howe ignores the partisan element of the American free trade debate. Whigs
and later Republicans were wedded to the tariff as a source of revenue.
Significantly, the biggest reduction in the tariff for decades was Buchanan’s Tariff
Act of 1857. Ironically, The Democrats were not a free trade party. Their views
varied considerably; Buchanan famously complained of being assailed as a
villain by both wings of his party on the issue. Yet in the context of the United
States, where Republicans remained committed to raising revenue from the tariff,
the Democrats were the more free-trade party. Given how central debates over
tariffs were to British and American politics this is vitally important to
understanding the connection between the Liberals and the Democrats.
The Spectator’s reports of Cobden’s visit to America illustrate that it was
Democrats who were far more amenable to his anti-protectionist arguments.
Following his visit, a Massachusetts Democrat named D. B. Bradford wrote
letters to much of the British press, including The Spectator, about how brilliant
Cobden’s speeches were. He also claimed that Buchanan had eventually hosted
Cobden in the White House for four days, so much did he enjoy his company.153
The Democrats were the only party with anything in common with Liberals on
free trade. No Republican-controlled newspaper could have so extolled the
virtues of free trade. The Spectator, controlled by Democrats, opted to
emphasise the potential in American for free-trade support, rather than explaining
the case for protectionism.
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The Spectator of 1859-61 addressed relatively few American political issues
directly. The sectional battle over slavery utterly dominated its American
coverage. The Spectator makes clear that the Buchananite attitude towards
slavery had nothing to do with its merits and all to do with the maintenance of the
Union. They condemned Governor Wise of Virginia as making “drunk”
statements about the potential for the Union to end in 1860.154 They also mocked
former Navy Secretary James Paudling of New York for being a pro-slavery
northerner “when even the South was ashamed of that institution.”155
More significantly, the manner in which the paper expressed its support for
Buchanan’s anti-abolitionist position shows that there was at least some liberal
justification for it. It demonstrates that whilst slavery was by this time a uniquely
American issue, Democratic support for the “peculiar institution” did not totally
undermine the party’s Liberal credentials. Given how the goal of the paper’s
American coverage was to advance the cause of James Buchanan, it is hardly
surprising that it pinned the blame for the growth in the sectional divide between
North and South on his Republican opponents and Democrats such as Douglas
who were more willing to compromise. Yet the paper did not opt to explain the
slavery debate by dismissing it as “peculiar institution” that was tied into the
uniqueness of America. In part, its intense focus on the question of the Union’s
future meant that the actual debate was downplayed and the emphasis placed on
how slavery was necessary for the survival of America. However, they also
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attacked Republican abolitionists for ignoring the constitution and the property
rights of slave-owners. In an apparently subtle attempt to link the Republican
Party with the Conservative Party they claimed “the Abolitionist party in the
United States has to a great extent continued the course originated by the old
Tory party…it is to a great extent hostile to the constitution.”156 It also appealed to
property rights, accusing abolitionists of ignoring them, in contrast to the British
abolitionists of an earlier era.157 Significantly, this shows that regardless of the
overwhelming British Liberal support for abolition in this era, Liberal arguments
predicated on self-determination and civil liberties could be put forward. Despite
their attitude to abolition the vast majority of British Liberals supported the
Confederate cause (Gladstone referred to them as having “made a nation”158)
once the Civil War broke out. The Spectator’s attempts to justify what became
Confederate positions demonstrate that there was an ideological foundation for
Liberals to back a non-abolitionist position.
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Conclusion
The Spectator of McHenry and Moran is a fascinating and useful source. It adds
to the historiography of Buchanan’s Presidency and of the history of the State
Department. More significantly, it is a source which illuminates Liberal admiration
for the United States and the ideological similarities between Britain’s Liberal
Party and America’s Democratic Party in the lead up to the American Civil War.
The Spectator’s proprietors’ sycophantic support for Buchanan reveals both that
some support for his Presidency existed and that loyalty to his administration was
firm in the American office in London. Yet the reality that this paper was the only
one in Britain (The Times offered tepid support rather than outright hostility like
other papers), and one of the very few anywhere, to offer such support, is
particularly damning. If it does not reflect on his failures as President, it must
reflect on a catastrophic failure of presentation to the public. In order for a paper
to be in favour of James Buchanan’s Presidency, it had to be owned and run by a
member of his administration from the same county in Pennsylvania who had
worked directly for Buchanan before his election!
Regarding ideology, The Spectator’s content adds support to Robert Kelley’s
thesis that the Democratic and Liberal parties were natural bedfellows (though
Kelly pays little attention to the years 1859-61). Liberal ideology, as it was in the
1850s, was remarkably compatible with support for James Buchanan. A large
aspect of that was the laissez-faire attitude shared by Democrats and Liberals to
fiscal and moral policy. Critically, both parties served as the anti-protectionist
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force in their politics and Buchanan was notably strong on this issue. Even on
slavery, despite the general Liberal abhorrence, The Spectator’s support for the
continued existence of slavery in America shows that an anti-abolitionist (though
not pro-slavery) position was not incompatible with a generally Liberal ideology.
There were some Liberal arguments to endorse such a position. The Liberal and
Democratic Parties fit well ideologically, there was also a more general fondness
for America as a land of less privilege and more equality amongst British
Liberals.
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